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Few issues are more central to early Soviet history than the relationslaip 
between Russia's revolutionary experience and the development of Stalin- 
ism. Established in the name of social equality and the end of political 
coercion, the Soviet "experiment" seemed by the mid-1930s to have eli- 
minated social conflict, but in nightmarish style. Stalinism became a syno- 
nym for social rigidity, thought control, and repression; "totalitarianism" 
entered the political vocabulary, to be used interchangeably with European 
fascism or Soviet socialism. Industrialization and rapid economic develop- 
ment nothwithstanding, the question for many was not one of progress, 
but how a vibrant revolutionary society lost sight of its goals, and rapidly 
stagnated into a repressive bureaucratic order. 
Many in the West have found the answer in the "imperatives" of Leninist 
theory and practice. As Stephen F. Cohen pointed out recently, a remark- 
able consensus has developed which in one way or another sees post-revolu- 
tionary Russia, and especially Stalinism, as the outgrowth of ideological 
presumption, doctrinal intolerance, and a ruthless, centrally directed party 
mechanism, x In this view, Leninism was ideally suited, in an opportunistic 
way, to the chaos of Russia's revolutionary context and the consequent need 
for social order; Stalinism, with its command economy, highly centralized 
bureaucracy, and police state politics, was the logical (if extreme) appli- 
cation of Leninist principles to the tasks of collectivization, industrialization, 
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and political control. Even those who argue with Trotsky that Stalin "betrayed" 
the revolution generally see the process of betrayal evolving through the 
generalized patterns of bureaucratization and "commandism." For a skilled 
manipulator like Stalin, the argument runs, it was relatively easy to ride these 
trends to the top )  
The problem with arguments which stress Leninist "imperatives" and objec- 
tive processes like bureaucratization is not, of course, that they are entirely 
wrongheaded. The problem lies rather in the way they tend to obscure the 
particularities Of social context in which Russia's revolution occurred, and 
discourage careful analysis of the day-to-day manner in which early Bolshe- 
viks confronted Russia's problems. Also, concepts like "centralization" and 
"bureaucratization;" like their more recent analogs "convergence" and "tech- 
nocracy," presume the importance of transcendent patterns of social organi- 
zation, and tend to ignore the attitudes, social goals, orvalues of the societies 
or movements they describe. In a word, arguments of this sort tend to be 
ahistorical. They often suggest causalities without clear demonstration, and 
in the process, generally imply the futility of radical politics. 
It is worth emphasizing, however, that similar structures may support radi- 
cally different institutions, and the very manner or style in which social func- 
tions are performed may seriously affect the nature of their institutional 
setting. A sense of urgency and a deep anxiety about survival, for example, 
may make the qualitative nature of central control institutions radically 
different in conditions of crisis (Soviet Russia in the Civil War) than in times 
of relative order (Russia under Brezhnev), even though their functions are the 
same. The converse may also be true: despite a radical restructuring of insti- 
tutions, continuities of attitude and outlook may obviate significant change. 
The degree to which Bolsheviks after 1917 absorbed the cultural directiveness 
of Tsarist society may well have had a far greater effect on Soviet develop- 
ment than the process of revolutionary leveling; in China, similarly, the 
presumptions of experts about their social importance may prove more in- 
fluential on future social organization than institutional settings which 
discourage expertise. Unless one explores historical settings carefully, in 
other words, and understands both cultural particularities and concrete sets 
of attitudes, structural appearances may belie profound developmental dif- 
ferences. 
Assumptions about "normative" social patterns like "centralization" and 
"bureaucratization" also affect related conceptions of deviance and social 
struggle. In James C. Davies "J-Curve" theory of revolution, conflict emerges 
when past progress is blocked and "manifest reality breaks away from 
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anticipated reality. ''a This formula is by now a familiar one to many students 
of revolutionary movements, but often, those devoted to "objective" social 
analysis seem unaware that notions like "anticipated reality" can be histori- 
cal quicksand. How can one disassociate "anticipation of future progress," 
for example, from assumptions about what is progressive? In a given histori- 
cal setting, deviance and conflict may indeed be related to frustrated expec- 
tations, but the expectations themselves may challenge the very type of 
social organization on which dominant conceptions of stability and progress 
are based. Similarly with the notion of struggle. If one assumes societies 
tend towards centralization, struggle tends to mean political competition. 
"Class struggle" becomes "which group will rule?" rather than "how do 
value systems differ" or "how will resources be allocated?"; and "struggle" 
itself seems inappropriate as a term of description when political compe- 
tition has either been neatly institutionalized or effectively eliminated. 
On the other hand, a perspective which assumes the presence of powerful 
disintegrative forces can regard the notion of struggle as much more funda- 
mental to social behavior. The advantage here is not prescription, as "vulgar" 
Marxists would have it, but a recognition that social antagonism is itself a 
"normative" pattern, and highly desirable insofar as equalization of social 
income and position are desirable ends. From this perspective one can also 
see more readily that significant differences often exist between the goals 
of broad social groups struggling for material or social betterment, and those 
of political organizations struggling for power in their name. 
These problems are not new ones for serious students, of course, but they 
deserve restatement here by way of opening discussion on the nature of 
change in Russia during the revolution of 1917, the subject of several recent 
books. In general, historical literature has emphasized the political nature of 
this process. Perhaps the most common view sees an archaic and inept Tsarist 
government beset by multiple pressures of industrialization and moderni- 
zation, virtually collapsing under the onslaught of World War I, and leaving 
the country on the brink of anarchy and chaos. The February revolution 
occurs to fill the political breach. But instead of the anticipated constitution- 
al monarchy and national "ministry of confidence," two rival political 
groups are organized, the unofficial but authoritative worker, soldier, and 
peasant soviets, and the "legitimate" Provisional Government. The ensuing 
months witness the rapid diminution of the power of each, as both prove 
unable to mobilize Russia effectively for her own well-being and defense. 
A tightly knit Bolshevik party, meanwhile, rapidly builds its strength. Better 
organized than its rivals, willing to play to the masses in its closely directed 
effort to discredit established authorities, unencumbered by democratic 
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scruples, Lenin and his comrades are able to maneuver into striking posi- 
tion. The October "coup" thus emerges as the logical, some say "inevitable," 
consequence of material deprivation, institutional underdevelopment, frus- 
trated expectations, and political machination: the "imperatives" of "back- 
wardness. ''4 Social upheaval is not, however, followed by significant social 
change, except for the elimination of Russia's aristocracy and small social 
elite. The Bolsheviks simply replace one group of rulers with another, pre- 
serving in exaggerated form traditional institutions of authority. Or so a 
common argument runs. 
A very different picture begins to emerge, however when 1917 is examined 
in broader terms of differential attitudes and the notion of social struggle. 
Pre-revolutionary conflict can be seen developing not so much from the 
exigencies of modernization and Tsarist administrative ineptitude as from 
a popular rejection of the premises on which "progress" was being measured, 
particularly in terms of the World War. Liberal politicians, seen by Tsarist 
officials as fomentors of popular discontent, actually presumed the creation 
of Western political institutions fundamentally alien to ordinary Russians, 
drawing closely from English models. The overwhelming mass of workers 
and peasants had few, if any, liberal commitments. Already in 1906, work- 
ers and especially peasants indicated they were not very likely to rally be- 
hind a Western system of rule, at least not in times of revolutionary upheav- 
al.s More important, liberal Russia saw the war as an important vehicle for 
"progress," a means of assuring substantial economic development and a 
consolidation of Russia's geopolitical importance. "War to Complete Vic- 
tory" meant territorial expansion and the annexation of Constantinople 
and the Dardanelles Strait, which many regarded as not legitimately Turk- 
ish.  6 The struggle of ordinary Russians, however, was not so much for 
imperial glory, as for material betterment, and for social and political insti- 
tutions which would end the instruments of past social and economic oppres- 
sion. It is quite possible, in fact, that Russian soldiers proved more "war 
weary" than their German, Austrian, or French comrades not because the car- 
nage was greater or the Tsarist regime significantly less competent, but be- 
cause the premises of imperialist competition on which the war was largely 
based were generally alien to their outlook. In any case, the war itself was 
readily identifiable in Russia with such traditional social inequities as gentry 
landholding and the estate system; and Russia's emergent social polarization 
was not simply one of class position, but also, and perhaps more profoundly, 
one of attitude and outlook. 
If one looks at Russian events this way, February marks the beginning of a 
two-tiered process of change. On one level, political parties and groups strug- 
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gled to secure the "Russia" of their various conceptions, hoping to impose 
their values and goals on a disorganized political economy. This involved the 
establishment of capable, authoritative instruments of power, and the invoca- 
tion from above of such Western moral imperatives as the "supremacy of law." 
On another, workers, peasants, and their comrades-in-arms struggled to free 
themselves from long-standing economic and social insecurities, now further 
intensified by the war. Equality was important not in terms of the ballot 
box, but in terms of distributing land; "freedom" for many was not the 
"liberty" (svoboda) of Western intellectual tradition, but the "will" (volia) 
of local community determination. This meant taking local matters into ones 
own hands, in the village tradition: forming peasant councils to appropriate 
land, and factory committees to assure fair wages, organizing militias to 
prevent "unprofitable" plants from closing and depriving workers of their 
livelihood. Seen from above the revolution unfolded into chaos; authority 
and order were lost to elemental anarchic forces (stikhiia). But from below, 
Russia was rapidly developing an enormous network of popular institutions, 
leading, in fact, to a more thoroughly "structured" society than ever before 
in Russian history, although obviously not one initially susceptible to effec- 
tive coordination or central direction. 
In this perspective, October is no longer a "revolution," but simply a stage 
in the increasingly irrelevant "upper" process of political maneuvering. Social 
polarization emerges from genuinely antagonistic values as well as social 
interest, and 1917 becomes in large measure a struggle over the premises on 
which a new society is to be built, rather than primarily an episode of poli- 
tical upheaval. Also from this perspective, the question of reimposing state 
authority, or Bolshevik "bureaucratization," can be seen as much in terms 
of social alignments as political strategy. Social context, the struggle of 
particular social groups to reassert their traditional roles, conflicting values, 
and such elements as rank and file Bolshevik attitudes emerge with Central 
Committee directives as factors of determinant importance. 
The great merit of Alexander Rabinowitch's study on the Bolsheviks 
is that he destroys any lingering notions of that party as a tightly organized, 
centrally directed group in 1917, uniform in its outlook and singleminded 
in its conspiratorial effort to seize power. Lenin and his comrades "came to 
power" (in Rabinowitch's nicely chosen phrase) by rejecting liberal notions 
of "progress," and indeed by ignoring Lenin's early organizational plan, and 
by closely reflecting mass aspirations. They did so programatically, by de- 
nouncing the war as alien and imperialist, and calling immediately for radi- 
cal social change. And they did so in institutional and organizational terms, 
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despite the elitist bias of Lenin's "vanguard" concept, by constructing a 
mass party on fundamentally democratic principles, welcoming rank and 
i'fie participation and structuring local cells very much like the workers' and 
soldiers' own committees. It is clear from Rabinowitch's presentation that 
the strictures of Lenin's famous pamphlet What is to be Done? meant very 
little to day-to-day party operations in 1917, and that most who joined and 
worked in Bolshevik ranks bore little resemblance to the "professional" revo- 
lutionaries it describes. 
This latter aspect of Bolshevik success is most important, and has generally 
been ignored. Too often it is assumed that the party Lenin envisioned in 
What is to be Done? largely materialized in 1917, and that this was a principal 
reason underlying victory in October. On the contrary, Rabinowitch shows 
that Lenin's followers in their day-to-day activities may have been among the 
least "elite" of Russia's parties, and certainly less so than the ostensible cham- 
pions of political democracy, the liberal Constitutional Democrats. While 
Lenin's supporters rallied in streets and factories, published newspapers for 
the trenches and enrolled almost anyone who supported their goals, Kadets 
spoke to workers and peasants in condescending prose, argued for the post- 
ponement of national elections, expressed concern about Russia's readiness 
for democratic government, and held their "mass" meetings in concert halls 
or social clubs. 7 Nor was careful organization, another "imperative" of 
What is to be DoneL a special feature of Bolshevik party structure before 
October. The Socialist Revolutionaries also had a highly directive Central 
Committee, as Oliver Radkey has shown, 8 one perhaps even more inclined 
to issuing orders than the Bolsheviks'. SRs constantly stressed the need for 
organization, especially at party congresses, and spent much of their energy 
and resources in this regard. Perhaps Lenin personally appreciated the value 
of organization more than other individual political figures, but as Rabino- 
witch demonstrates, this found no special reflection in everyday party activ- 
ity, at least not for most of 1917. 
Instead, Rabinowitch shows that what distinguished the Bolsheviks dramati- 
caUy in this period from the party of Lenin's initial conception, and what 
contributed significiantly to the party's success, was its ability at every level 
to tolerate differences, publicly and privately, and the refusal even of its 
top leadership to sever ties with dissident elements. While the SRs voted to 
muzzle their most prominent figure, Victor Chernov, and insisted in a Central 
Committee resolution that all members were "obliged to adhere to its decrees 
in each and every ac t i on . . ,  without the privilege of defending the minority's 
positions, and without the privilege of voting contrary to the will of the 
Central Committee," (a posture which eventually led to a three-way split 
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in SR ranks), 9 Bolshevik leaders were remarkably tolerant of different views 
in their ranks. The prevailing view, as Rabinowitch rightly argues, was one 
of "moderation." This helped keep the party together and growing during 
such troublesome episodes as the Petrograd leadership's negative response 
to Lenin's April "theses," and even after the debacle of the July Days, when 
Bolshevik soldiers moved on their own to seize power in the party's name. 
Rabinowitch shows, for example, how the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" 
was officially withdrawn at the Sixth Bolshevik Congress in July, (as Lenin 
moved away from any collaboration whatsoever with Mensheviks and SRs), 
but how at the same time, as late as September, Kamenev was calling openly 
for the creation of a broad, democratic coalition at the Democration Con- 
ference, while Trotsky, now chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, urged full 
power to soviets everywhere. Many local party groups similarly rejected 
the Sixth Congress resolution, as Rabinowitch shows, and continued to work 
with party rivals, sometimes even presenting a united "Social Democratic" 
slate in local elections. This diversity was true on other issues as well, rang- 
ing from cooperation with Menshevik dominated trade unions to mobilizing 
the peasants. Rabinowitch makes clear that the manner in which Lenin 
retained Zinoviev and Kamenev in positions of responsibility after their 
celebrated opposition to seizing power in October (an opposition, incidently, 
which was broadcast all over the Petrograd press), was in fact, part and parcel 
of the party's general revolutionary style, at least in this period. 
Rabinowitch uses the terms "flexible" and "tolerant" to describe the atti- 
tude of party leaders within their own organization, and he makes a persua- 
sive case. He documents the lively and intense debate which characterized 
party meetings at all levels, and shows how local (district) party organi- 
zations were especially democratic and decentralized. In my view, these 
very attributes - so conspicuously lacking in Stalin's party - may well 
have been the essence of Bolshevik organizational power in 1917. Without 
being pushed from the party by ideological or organizational rigidity or 
excessive directiveness from the Central Committee, individuals and local 
party groups with varying views on specific issues could continue to fight 
together for common, overall objectives, particularly the acquisition of state 
power. 
This is not to imply that Lenin's supporters were in any way irresolute in 
terms of leading Russia away from "bourgeois" rule, that they were not 
persistently harsh in their attacks on socialist moderates and "conciliation- 
ists," or that Lenin's energy and Trotsky's charisma were not also important 
factors in determining the revolution's course. But it is to maintain that in 
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contrast to their rivals, as Rabinowitch demonstrates, the Bolsheviks in 1917 
were an open, mass organization, genuinely tuned to the attitudes and desires 
of ordinary workers and even many peasants, particularly those in uniform. 
Primarily for this reason they continued to gain organizational strength 
in 1917, and by September were able to capture majorities not only in the 
Moscow and Petrograd Soviets, but also in the Moscow City Duma. In con- 
ception, the party leadership, and especially Lenin, continued to see the 
Bolsheviks as a highly centralized political organization, capable of respond- 
ing quickly and effectively to directives from above. Lenin certainly never 
lost his commitment to centralism, expressed so cogently in What Is to Be 
Done?, and maintaining party democracy was clearly unimportant as com- 
pared to gaining power. But in practice during 1917, Lenin's party conducted 
its affairs to a very great extent in the same fashion as the people it fairly 
claimed to represent: as rough and tumble populist democrats, without much 
regard for formal democratic procedures, but with tolerance for differences 
within party ranks, and without excessive "commandism." Thus a key to 
their support and organization strength was not only their commitment to 
immediate, radical social change, but also their popular style. 
How then, did the party rapidly metamorphize into the centralized and 
increasingly bureaucratic organization which so facilitated Stalin's rise to 
power? John Keep rightly suggests a two-fold answer in his fine study, 
both parts of which relate to the extraordinarily difficult circumstances 
in which most Russians found themselves during the revolution and civil 
war years. Keep shows first how Russian society "mobilized" during 
1917 around various local institutions. In urban areas, particularly Moscow 
and Leningrad, workers formed scores of individual factory committees, 
organized trade unions, set up soviets of all sorts. In the countryside 
peasants also organized, sometimes in land and food committees, sometimes 
in soviets, occasionally in local zemstvos. The primary goal of all these groups 
was to deal with problems of production and supply, and to seek improve- 
ment in material conditions. Factory committees led the fight for higher 
wages and better working conditions, but also worked to assure continuity 
in production and to maintain labor discipline. An agreement between the 
committees and the Petrograd Society of Manufacturers in March sanctified 
these organizations in part because the manufacturers themselves recognized 
the value of worker participation in factory affairs. 1~ In April, the Provisional 
Government established a network of local land committees for similar 
reasons, assuming those directly involved in agriculture could deal most 
effectively with problems of food supplyJ l 
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This process was largely spontaneous, and in his initial perspectives, Keep 
seems to be among those who regard the revolution essentially in terms of 
political disintegration and Leninist skullduggery. He insists in his introduc- 
tion that "anarchy" and "chaos" are the terms which best describe the state 
of Russia in 1917. But Keep is also a first-rate historian, with eyes keenly 
focused on social process. The evidence he examines quickly leads him to 
more sophisticated description. He shows, for example, how the very fact 
of mass participation in myriad local organizations created strong institu- 
tional pressures towards centralization and directiveness. Local groups often 
conflicted with each other in the pursuit of similar goals, and few organiza- 
tions were capable on their own of making any substantial improvements in 
such pressing areas as food supply. The market mechanism linking town and 
countryside was also in shambles, and the parasitic army continued its stran- 
glehold on transport, even as the state treasury was being drained of virtually 
all its resources. 
In these circumstances, what Keep calls the "cadre" of mass organizations 
(only a few of whom at first were Bolsheviks) began to play increasingly 
directive roles. Centralizing agencies of various types were set up at differ- 
ent levels, uniting, for example, most of the railroad workers' committees 
in Moscow yards and shops in a special railroad soviet, or various trade 
union groups in local and regional "central bureaus." Various types of "exec- 
utive committees' also began to play increasing roles within individual organ- 
izations. Keep uses the term "initiative group" to describe these bodies, and 
what emerges implicitly from the wealth of material he presents is not a 
conspiratorial effort on the Bolsheviks' part to "seize power," but a natural 
gravitation of party activists to positions of organizational responsibility. It 
is this process of "gravitation" which forms the second part of Keep's expla- 
nation for emergent authoritarianism. 
Keep's personal sympathies are overtly liberal, perhaps even conservative. He 
is unabashed in his condemnation of Leninist politics, and is clearly repelled 
by the contemporary Soviet leviathan. But however important high politics 
later became, Keeps suggests forcefully that the councils of state power were 
largely secondary in terms of the revolution itself. Directives from Petrograd 
concerning food procurement, transport, the supply of raw materials to 
industry, even military recruitment could only be generalized statements of 
intent; their implementation had to depend on specific local conditions and 
the inclinations of various local committees. Government statements became 
policy questions, to be debated in terms of the political merits of this or that 
party; the principles on which Russian society was actually administered 
stemmed directly from popular inclinations. "Mass mobilization" is a reason- 
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able term for this process, as Keep uses it, providing one recognizes that 
throughout 1917, the mobilizing agencies, for the most part, were not im- 
posed from above. One can imagine a very different chronicle of cabinets and 
ministers having virtually no effect at all on this process. 
What did matter, and to an increasing degree, was both the ineffectiveness 
of local committees in meeting popular needs, and the political sympathies 
of increasingly directive cadre elements. Despite his own deep-seated anti- 
Marxism, Keep shows Russian social process in 1917 to involve a powerful 
dialectic, one in which social leveling and the destruction of traditional 
institutions and patterns of authority led spontaneously in the course of 
meeting social needs to the development of a new apparat. 
In my judgment, those centralizing pressures from below need not have led 
"inevitably" to authoritarianism, as Keep seems to imply, but to avoid it, 
those propelled into positions of power had to be capable of exercising 
command and enforcing emergency directives without losing their commit- 
ment to the ultimate establishment of political democracy. Lenin and most 
Bolshevik leaders, of course, had no such commitments; their own support 
for centralization was not simply a situational response, but an integral part 
of Leninist political philosophy, however different the actual conduct of 
local party affairs before October. Thus the Bolsheviks were well tuned to 
mesh with broader centralizing tendencies during the revolution not because 
of Leninist prescriptions or a tightly directed party machine but because 
they were politically and ideologically close to the mass of Russia's urban 
workers and hence felt the need from below for directiveness. They had 
a popular style; they were willing and anxious to take control, and ideolog- 
ically inclined to being directive themselves. Their organizational base 
was constantly expanding, in part because they tolerated differences in party 
ranks and avoided serious splits, and they were capable, especially after 
the formation of Red Guard units, of exercising authority. 
Does this mean, then, that an explanation for Soviet authoritarianism must 
be sought, at least initially, in the objective social processes of the 1917 
revolution? I would argue that to a large extent it does, a conclusion possibly 
discomfiting to those who would exaggerate Lenin or Leninism in either 
positive or negative terms. The tendency towards centralization had strong 
dynamic qualities of its own in 1917, ones which could conceivably have 
been harnessed by other well-organized movements. This, however, is not 
to diminish Lenin's personal genius, or the way in which Bolshevik boldness 
in such matters as opposing the war generated popular sympathies and mobi- 
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lized a popular radicalism. Lenin crystalized radical sentiment more cogently 
than any other political figure in 1917. Bolshevik authoritarianism, in 
contrast, say, to that of Kornilov, Kolchak, or others on the right, gained 
a relatively substantial degree of popular support precisely because the party 
in subjective terms was close to masses of workers and soldiers. 
To Charles Bettelheim, however, Director of Studies at the l~cole Practique 
des Hautes l~tudes, Laureat of the French Academy, and a leading theorist 
of revolutionary socialism, the Bolsheviks' coming to power hardly assured 
victory for Russia's workers, and not because Lenin or the party's leadership 
betrayed popular goals. Rather, Bettelheim argues that the crucial feature of 
early Soviet history is the defeat of Russia's proletariat by bourgeois forces. 
Instead of constructing socialism, the Soviet Union consequently developed 
into a "capitalist state of a particular type," a phenomenon which has 
disoriented revolutionaries, ideologically disarmed Russian workers, and 
drastically weakened the international socialist movement by falsely identi- 
fying the Soviet system with socialism, la 
Bettelheim's vision of social change is a very particular one. In his view, 
the "driving force of history is the class struggle, and . . .  as long as classes 
exist, it is through conflicts between classes that social relations are trans- 
formed," not economic conditions or efforts to cope with desperate problems 
of administration. Arguments resting on issues of economics or political 
organization are but other versions of a useless "congealed Marxism," wheth- 
er offered by consious Marxists or not. Is Analyses which turn on the "pri- 
macy of productive forces" distort historical understanding. They camou- 
flage the true nature of class relations, and lead to a mechanistic identi- 
fication of legal forms of ownership with class relations. 14 Thus, the fact 
that workers' committees and peasant soviets seized factories and confis- 
cated estates did not necessarily mean the establishment of proletarian hegem- 
ony, and the fact that the Bolshevik party rapidly assumed control over 
Russia's new administrative appartus in the name of workers and peasants 
does not mean to Bettelheim that the party acheived revolutionary goals. 
Like Keep, Bettelheim sees the emergence of a group of professional admin- 
istrators in Russia's mass revolutionary organizations as a crucial element 
in the subsequent development of Bolshevism. But rather than aiding the 
workers' cause, these elements and their hierarchical pattern of control 
were the foundation of a new bourgeois order and a crucial weakness in 
the proletariat's struggle for hegemony. Moreover, these "bourgeois" pat- 
terns emerged not so much as a consequence of administrative necessity, 
but as a result of Russia's underdeveloped revolutionary consciousness, one 
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which was insufficiently attentive to the dangers of "economism." "What had 
to a large extent penetrated a decisive section of the working class masses," 
Bettelheim writes, "were not the fundamental ideas of revolutionary Marxism 
- those which light up the path to socialism and reveal what is necessary 
for the march to communism - but those that corresponded to what Lenin 
called 'immediate tasks'. ''15 By "fundamental ideas," Bettelheim has in mind 
an awareness of bourgeois attitudes and patterns of behavior, and the notion 
of class struggle. By accusing the Bolsheviks of responding to "immediate 
tasks," he means that Russian workers and the party itself failed to handle 
correctly the contradiction between the proletarian character of Russia's new 
ruling power, and the necessity to involve broad non-proletarian masses in the 
organs of administration. 
Thus, as the management of public affairs became concentrated in the hands 
of a small elite, Russia's bourgeoisie, with its practical expertise and its 
presumptions about the appropriateness of top-down social control, gained 
a secure foothold. This reinforced "the state  aspect of the organization of 
the ruling power, the separation of machinery of government from the 
masses . . . .  and non-democratic forms of centralization. ''16 One might add 
that it also reinforced the traditional Russian pattern of authority, one 
which had temporarily been destroyed by the mass organizations but which 
remained the only style of national government with which ordinary Russians 
were really familiar. The fundamental task of a revolutionary party at this 
vital juncture was to prevent old patterns from re-emerging. Instead, the new 
administrative elite moved quickly to appoint additional specialists and manag- 
ers, imposed differential wage scales and other inequities, and re-established 
what Bettelheim rightly calls the traditional components of "capitalist disci- 
pline." While Russia's private or petty bourgeoisie was largely weakened and 
the gentry almost fully expropriated, he argues, a new "state bourgeoisie" 
developed rapidly. Objective bourgeois social relations were perpetuated be- 
hind a proletarian facade. 
Many of these administrators, moreover, were not only far removed from 
Russian workers in terms of social origin, but also increasingly remote from 
soviets, workers' committees, and other institutions of mass control. Admin- 
istrative independence in the name of economic efficiency became the 
rationalization for eliminating participatory democracy and its fledgling 
institutions. The new elite, according to Bettelheim, was not even composed 
of new people; former specialists and bureaucrats simply reassumed their 
traditional tasks. This encouraged the bourgeoisie as a whole, and had a 
mushrooming effect. More members of the old order inf'dtrated the state 
apparatus, and rapidly extended their dominance. It also acted to socialize 
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those genuinely proletarian activists who had risen directly from revolu- 
tionary ranks, and who quickly acquired bourgeois styles and values. 
As this occurred, in Bettelheim's view, fundamental changes also began 
to take place within the Bolshevik party, which grew from a small group 
of some 20,000 revolutionary activists in early 1917 to more than 600,000 
members by the beginning of 1920. Relations between rank and file members 
and the party's higher organs changed. The Politburo became a fixed body of 
five permanent members, and many if not most of the decisions which had 
previously been the subject of much debate at lower levels now became its 
province alone. In fact, the eclipse of participatory methods in areas of 
state administration could not help but affect the party's own apparatus. Not 
only was the state mechanism increasingly influential in party affairs, it 
helped establish a new authoritarian ethos. Also, it provoked the creation of 
new control institutions like the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, which 
in turn reinforced growing authoritarian tendencies. 
What is one to make of all this? A good deal of Bettelheim's analysis is 
exaggerated and simplistic. His insistance that "economism" and what he 
calls "the problematic of economic forces" is a crude distortion of Marxism 
shows only that one can take what one wants from Marx's writings. His argu- 
ment that "fear gripped the Russian bourgeoisie" whenever the established 
order was threatened underestimates the role of liberals in toppling the Tsarist 
regime in their effort to "modernize" the state and prosecute the war effec- 
tively, and there is still precious little evidence on which to make judgments 
about the attitudes and outlooks of Russia's new administrative elite, much 
less accurate information of its social origins. To argue that "capitalist disci- 
pline" was reestablished after October is not to demonstrate the emergence 
into power of a new, state bourgeoisie. 
Bettelheim also underestimates the difficulties of Russian social and econom- 
ic circumstances during the revolution and civil war, difficulties I will 
return to in a moment. He is totally wrong in arguing that Lenin, like Mao, 
was consistently a partisan of a "mass revolutionary line," resisting forcefully 
the bureaucratization of both party and state. It is wishful reading of Lenin's 
later writings to say that the Russian leader "urgently stressed the need vigor- 
ously to apply a mass line once again" as a means for acheiving the revolution- 
ary transformation of political and economic relations. 17 In my view, 
Lenin's concern in his later essays, such as Better Less but Better, is not for 
increased popular control but for a streamlined, more effective party appa- 
ratus, one perhaps more proletarian in social composition, but still implicitly 
more elitist. Lenin never trusted control from below, least of all in the 
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countryside, despite the fact that the party in 1917 largely developed from 
below into a popular, mass organization. There was, consistently, a pater- 
nalism in his empathy for Russia's workers and poor peasants, and if his 
commitment to proletarian interests was dominant and deep-rooted, his 
enormous anxiety in the years after 1917 had overwhelmingly to do with 
retaining power, party stability, and Stalin's heavy handling of the explosive 
nationality question, not with turning the party in a Maoist direction. 
But despite his often inpenetrable jargon, Bettelheim focuses neatly on the 
crucial role of social relations in affecting class structure, and on the inti- 
mate relationship between presumptions of competence and expertise, and 
the development of social institutions which reinforce hierarchy and weaken 
commitment to either social or political democracy. The extensive use of 
material rewards and substantial wage differentials did encourage what 
might fairly be called "bourgeois" social relations, even if the extent to 
which pre-revolutionary bourgeois elements reassumed positions of author- 
ity still needs to be demonstrated. What Bettelheim calls for implicitly, if 
not in clear-cut terms, is a consciousness of style and affect, as well as sensi- 
tivity to attitudinal aspects of class. And this, it seems to me, is crucial to 
understanding the emergence of Stalinism. 
For in some ways, paradoxically, Bolshevik success was also the source of a 
fatal weakness. By this I don't mean that instruments of authority and con- 
trol led "necessarily" to Stalinism, as some argue (although there were cer- 
tainly strong tendencies in that direction); or even that Bolshevik commit- 
ment to party and organization doomed Russia to rule by apparatchiks. 
Bettelheim is right to try to break with a conception of the Russian revolu- 
tion which presents its history "as the 'outcome' of decisions and 'choices' 
made by the Bolshevik party, and thus in imagination making the party the 
demiurge, responsible for all successes and fai lures . . . - is  Keep, Rabinowitch, 
and other serious students of this period would, I think, agree. 
Rather, I have in mind that once the Bolsheviks successfully acquired the 
rudiments of state power, it was no longer necessary for them to maintain 
the tolerance or flexibility which had brought them such support in 1917, 
or even close practical ties with ordinary workers, and they regressed to the 
elitism of Lenin's What Is to Be Done? Instead, as Bolsheviks acquired res- 
ponsibility for dealing with Russia's crushing economic problems, and for 
directing rather than simply energizing the struggle against internal and for- 
eign enemies, party members at all levels slid easily into "commandism" and 
hierarchy. Any party in power in these circumstances would have been 
pressured in similar directions, as the history of Russia's liberal Constitutional 
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Democrats during the Civil War suggestsJ 9 The Bolsheviks moved towards 
authoritarianism not only in response to objective circumstances, but also, 
as I've already suggested, as a result of ideological disposition. A mass line 
might have been ideologically desirable in these circumstances from the 
standpoint of democratic Marxism, and one might even argue with Bettel- 
heim that the future of a genuine revolutionary socialism depended on it. 
But as a means of reorganizing Russia's hopeless economy, of preventing 
or at least minimizing starvation, of coping with massive unemployment and 
the rapid, spontaneous demobilization of the old army, mass methods could 
hardly have been effective, and in my view, would only have facilitated the 
success of anti-Bolshevik forces. 
It is this necessity for centralized control during the Civil War which Profes- 
sor Radkey seems to ignore in his discussion of the 1920-21 Tambov 
peasant rebellion. 2~ This episode was dearly one of the most troublesome 
of the Civil War period for Lenin and the Bolsheviks, and involved at its peak 
some 20,000-25,000 well organized men, led by Alexander Antonov. The 
uprising developed primarily in response to Bolshevik food levies, which in 
1920 exacted more from the peasants than they needed for their own sur- 
vival, often in brutal fashion. In 1921 Lenin was forced to organize a full- 
scale military force to suppress it, headed by a Special Plenipotentiary Com- 
mission of the Central Executive Committee under Antonov-Ovseenko. 
Radkey has enormous sympathy for peasant rebels, largely precipitated (if 
one can judge from his constant asides) by an unmitigated hostility to com- 
munists and intellectuals. He makes no effort to relate the Tambov events 
to other comparable European peasant rebellions (and seems quite unfamiliar 
with works like Hobsbawm's Bandits), but his study is informative and lively. 
What he fails to see is the degree to which the Russian social context it- 
self helped force the unspeakable horrors of  Civil War on Bolsheviks and non- 
Bolsheviks alike. Workers in Moscow and Petrograd in 1920 were also on 
subsistence wages, just like the Tambov peasants. The forcible extraction of 
grain was certainly not a desirable strategy from the Bolsheviks' viewpoint, 
and Lenin may well have recognized (as does Radkey) that the levies were 
sometimes used to satisfy local grievances as well as to support the urban 
areas, and were fundamentally corrupting in a number of ways to the Bol- 
shevik movement as a whole. It was hardly the "kulaks" who suffered alone 
from the exactions; antipathy between town and country grew beyond 
remedy, and set the background for civil war in the 1930s, when Stalin 
"solved" the problem through collectivization. In 1920 and 1921, only the 
callous could truly relish provincial administrative responsibilities, and one 
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can appreciate the growing distance between party and people more by study- 
ing events in Tambov than by focusing on party ideology or organization. 
Here, perhaps, is a more powerful reason for the eclipse of a mass revolution- 
ary consciousness than the infiltration of Bettelheim's "bourgeois" ele- 
ments, although the two are surely related. To say with Radkey, however, 
that the Tambov peasants were a "genuine revolutionary force against tyran- 
ny, ''21 and to imply, as Radkey does, that Antonov and the peasant rebels 
might have established a less repressive order than the Bolsheviks, is virtually 
to ignore the realities of Russia's social dislocation and economic catastrophe. 
What may have been possible, but extraordinally difficult, for Russian radi- 
cals in this period, was the maintenance of substantial directiveness without 
excessive "commandism," a revolutionary attitude towards the style of 
control and towards social relations, without formally institutionalizing at 
this juncture the forms of mass social and political democracy. In conditions 
of total economic dislocation, class struggle need not involve organic social 
or political reconstruction, if revolutionary leaders can maintain a radical 
consciousness. In other words, in conditions such as Russia experienced, class 
struggle is imperative not so much as Bettelheim insists, to prevent bourgeois 
experts from assuming positions of administrative competency, but to prevent 
the perpetuation of bourgeois attitudes and social relations. Of course, as far 
as the Bolsheviks are concerned, this would have required a leadership group 
committed in the main to democratic practices, which it was not. 
This raises a final question, but one which for now must remain open. Was 
there, in fact, a commitment among Russian workers and peasants themselves 
to what revolutionary intellectuals called proletarian democracy, or was 
bourgeois acquisitiveness and the desire to dominate a more universal con- 
dition? We return to Professor Davies' "J-Curve," which assumes that those 
whose expectations are not full'flied share the values of those whose control 
they are challenging. Professor Keep suggests the dominant peasant mood in 
1917 was one of "self-confidence" and "optimism," a conviction that a new 
age of brotherhood was about to dawn in which "all major decisions would 
be taken at the lowest possible level. ''22 If he is right (and if we ignore his 
subsequent suggestion that these were really naive and utopian perspectives, 
which threatened to perpetuate Russia's backwardness vis-a-vis more industri- 
alized nations), then a struggle for revolutionary social relations might well 
have succeeded in eventually controlling "bureaucratic imperatives." If not, 
even the most pristine of revolutionary parties might well have been over- 
whelmed by the difficulties of "bringing consciousness to the people." At 
the very least, enormous energy would have had to be spent on education 
and training, and commitment to developing revolutionary consciousness 
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could not weaken even after power was secure. Whether socialist democracy 
was possible at all in Russia, however, or whether it may develop in the 
future, as Roy Medvedev has suggested, 23 is a subject for further discussion. 
It is also one that will only be resolved by additional studies which look close- 
ly at attitudes and values, the nature of social struggle, and the particu- 
larities of  Russia's historical experience. 
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